Arguing with an engineer...

[OpticsEngineer]

I have been going through my fathers old engineering notes and ran across this sign he had in his office for a while back in the 1970's





My wife seemed to really like get a kick out of this so I thought it worth sharing.

 

[Simon Garrett]

It's pointless arguing with an engineer, as engineers know the answer. (I speak as an engineer.) However, no two engineers agree what the answer is.

 

[mosswings]

It's pointless arguing with an engineer, as engineers know the answer. (I speak as an engineer.) However, no two engineers agree what the answer is.

--
Simon

However, Thar's better than having two scientists arguing, because there would be at least 3 possible answers to the question and at least 4 peer-reviewed publications.

 

[Simon Garrett]

It's pointless arguing with an engineer, as engineers know the answer. (I speak as an engineer.) However, no two engineers agree what the answer is.

 

[Detail Man]

I have been going through my fathers old engineering notes and ran across this sign he had in his office for a while back in the 1970's



My wife seemed to really like get a kick out of this so I thought it worth sharing.

Having worked for a time in the electronic engineering design/development field, I would here quip:

Arguing with an Engineering Manager can be like wrestling with a warthog - especially in organizations that transform engineers into technicians, and transform technicians into rework-assemblers ! ...

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

http://www.animateit.net/data/media/nov2011/64454.gif

Note: this is a link to an animated GIF.


DM

 

[roadtrpr]

Artwork by Hard Work

Loading…

www.zazzle.com

 

[Phil214757]

Artwork by Hard Work

http://www.zazzle.com/hardwork/gifts?cg=196161980845723850

Never argue, but black mail is useful. If you add X without redundancy, an in depth evaluation of it's long term performance will need to be added to your development schedule.

--
Phil Agur
“Imagination is more important than knowledge..." -- Albert Einstein

 

[J C Brown]

A gift from my daughter-in-law

Good advice?

Jimmy

--
J C Brown
Though it may not have been discovered yet there is a logical explanation for everything.

 

[roadtrpr]

Artwork by Hard Work

http://www.zazzle.com/hardwork/gifts?cg=196161980845723850

Never argue, but black mail is useful. If you add X without redundancy, an in depth evaluation of it's long term performance will need to be added to your development schedule.

But doesn't that prematurely dismiss the promise of effectively exploiting the prospective potentialities of seamless deployment of strategic backend functionalities?

--
Phil Agur
“Imagination is more important than knowledge..." -- Albert Einstein

 

[Austinian]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

 

[Detail Man]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

Yes, the (so to speak) "downstream" relation of reliability/manufacturing/test engineering personnel relative to design/development engineering functions affords those so involved some "insulation" from management-harbored fantasies engendered without respect to realities surrounding "time-lines".

The worst-case situation is one where the marketing departments have and/or are promising future products to customers with characteristics and specifications that design/development departments have not yet (and may possibly never) manage to actually achieve (in terms of manufacturability).

Upper and mid-level management all too often being made up of people who would/have made the worst design/development engineers, I have seen various methods utilized in order to hold off such management fantasies from leading to premature "finalizations and releases" of prototype systems.

The craftiest (and most effective) that I have seen is where a designer engineer who I worked with literally hid particular (already received) specific component samples/orders required in order to construct prototype, in-development circuits/systems in his desk, telling his (in that particular case, and not unusually in general) mutton-headed mid-level engineering manager (returning wide-eyed and full of jive from the latest weekly management "fantasy-fests") that the necessary components to construct prototypes had not yet arrived [when those part(s) lay craftily hidden inside of his desk].

The above technique worked beautifully in that particular case (where, in large sized companies, mid-level managers are seldom keenly aware of what the shipping/receiving departments have, or have not, received in the way of specific ordered items) - it "short circuited" management's delusions.

That such rather crafty tactics as described above are (justifiably) necessary to sometimes engage in is indeed a sad commentary on the kind of endemic "disconnects from reality" that marketing departments and engineering managers can become woefully prone to within large organizations.

DM

 

[Austinian]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

Yes, the (so to speak) "downstream" relation of reliability/manufacturing/test engineering personnel relative to design/development engineering functions affords those so involved some "insulation" from management-harbored fantasies engendered without respect to realities surrounding "time-lines".

The worst-case situation is one where the marketing departments have and/or are promising future products to customers with characteristics and specifications that design/development departments have not yet (and may possibly never) manage to actually achieve (in terms of manufacturability).

Yes, another frequent occurrence...IME often caused by poor/no communication between design, manufacturing, QA and assembly.

The consequent delays and increased production costs were entirely avoidable. :-(

Upper and mid-level management all too often being made up of people who would/have made the worst design/development engineers, I have seen various methods utilized in order to hold off such management fantasies from leading to premature "finalizations and releases" of prototype systems.

The craftiest (and most effective) that I have seen is where a designer engineer who I worked with literally hid particular (already received) specific component samples/orders required in order to construct prototype, in-development circuits/systems in his desk, telling his (in that particular case, and not unusually in general) mutton-headed mid-level engineering manager (returning wide-eyed and full of jive from the latest weekly management "fantasy-fests") that the necessary components to construct prototypes had not yet arrived [when those part(s) lay craftily hidden inside of his desk].

The above technique worked beautifully in that particular case (where, in large sized companies, mid-level managers are seldom keenly aware of what the shipping/receiving departments have, or have not, received in the way of specific ordered items) - it "short circuited" management's delusions.

That such rather crafty tactics as described above are (justifiably) necessary to sometimes engage in is indeed a sad commentary on the kind of endemic "disconnects from reality" that marketing departments and engineering managers can become woefully prone to within large organizations.

DM

Sad but true.

 

[Detail Man]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

Yes, the (so to speak) "downstream" relation of reliability/manufacturing/test engineering personnel relative to design/development engineering functions affords those so involved some "insulation" from management-harbored fantasies engendered without respect to realities surrounding "time-lines".

The worst-case situation is one where the marketing departments have and/or are promising future products to customers with characteristics and specifications that design/development departments have not yet (and may possibly never) manage to actually achieve (in terms of manufacturability).

Yes, another frequent occurrence...IME often caused by poor/no communication between design, manufacturing, QA and assembly.

Such situations are not without understandable (though not necessarily "defensible") human nature causations. (In large, segmented organizations), "localized empires" are built - serving (sadly, often foremost) in order to protect the professional reputations of the managers and employees existing within such sub-divisions. Blame-shifting and "CYA" seems an endemically common "currency".

The consequent delays and increased production costs were entirely avoidable. :-(

In the particular case cited in my posted accounts, the company had been acquired by a very large parent-corporation whose profits were of a magnitude where obtaining tax write-offs for monetary losses had equal (or perhaps even greater) impact upon tax obligations than did monetary profits.

Consequentially, a rather "surreal" environment evolved - with around 1,000 employes (literally and figuratively) "upstairs" (in management, marketing, and design/development engineering), and around 1,000 employees "downstairs" (in manufacturing/test engineering and production assembly departments). The "arrogance" (and indifference) "at the top" swelled profusely. It was the largest (and the last) electronics company that I worked for. My previous stints had been in much smaller sized (and in many ways less "SNAFU-prone") companies.

The parent corporation constructed a multi-million dollar facility for the owned company, and allowed them to lose significant amounts of money for seven years straight. The first year that the owned company "turned a profit", the parent-corporation abruptly sold them off ...

Upper and mid-level management all too often being made up of people who would/have made the worst design/development engineers, I have seen various methods utilized in order to hold off such management fantasies from leading to premature "finalizations and releases" of prototype systems.

The craftiest (and most effective) that I have seen is where a designer engineer who I worked with literally hid particular (already received) specific component samples/orders required in order to construct prototype, in-development circuits/systems in his desk, telling his (in that particular case, and not unusually in general) mutton-headed mid-level engineering manager (returning wide-eyed and full of jive from the latest weekly management "fantasy-fests") that the necessary components to construct prototypes had not yet arrived [when those part(s) lay craftily hidden inside of his desk].

The above technique worked beautifully in that particular case (where, in large sized companies, mid-level managers are seldom keenly aware of what the shipping/receiving departments have, or have not, received in the way of specific ordered items) - it "short circuited" management's delusions.

That such rather crafty tactics as described above are (justifiably) necessary to sometimes engage in is indeed a sad commentary on the kind of endemic "disconnects from reality" that marketing departments and engineering managers can become woefully prone to within large organizations.

Sad but true.

Early on in my life I decided to leave college, not to obtain a EE degree, and to self-educate myself (with the assistance of some friends who were engineers) while working in the electronic engineering design and development field. I don't regret that decision early on - as the field of electronic design and development engineering proved to be 90% politics and BS, and the level of understanding and respect for mathematics and theory (among EEs who I worked with, in my own industry experience) was in many cases lacking. All the bosses wanted to see was (rhetorical) "a-holes and elbows" ...

Economics seems to be not the only "dismal profession". The cardinal sin appeared to be to reveal (one's own or others') relative ignorance surrounding mathematics/theory. That psychology (by far) eclipsed desires on peoples' part to create/produce quality products. It was far more about "them".

DM

 

[Austinian]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

Yes, the (so to speak) "downstream" relation of reliability/manufacturing/test engineering personnel relative to design/development engineering functions affords those so involved some "insulation" from management-harbored fantasies engendered without respect to realities surrounding "time-lines".

The worst-case situation is one where the marketing departments have and/or are promising future products to customers with characteristics and specifications that design/development departments have not yet (and may possibly never) manage to actually achieve (in terms of manufacturability).

Yes, another frequent occurrence...IME often caused by poor/no communication between design, manufacturing, QA and assembly.

Such situations are not without understandable (though not necessarily "defensible") human nature causations. (In large, segmented organizations), "localized empires" are built - serving (sadly, often foremost) in order to protect the professional reputations of the managers and employees existing within such sub-divisions. Blame-shifting and "CYA" seems an endemically common "currency".

The consequent delays and increased production costs were entirely avoidable. :-(

In the particular case cited in my posted accounts, the company had been acquired by a very large parent-corporation whose profits were of a magnitude where obtaining tax write-offs for monetary losses had equal (or perhaps even greater) impact upon tax obligations than did monetary profits.

The medium-large company I think of most often WRT managerial ineptitude, poor inter-group communication, and crude, obvious lies to their employees did not have that excuse; their grandiose and (as it proved) ill-advised debt-fueled expansion plans went awry to the extent that even major reductions-in-force couldn't save them.

Eventually they were taken over by a larger rival...but I was gone by then. The handwriting on the wall was there for all to see in the increasingly empty parking lots and underutilized equipment.

 

[Detail Man]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

Yes, the (so to speak) "downstream" relation of reliability/manufacturing/test engineering personnel relative to design/development engineering functions affords those so involved some "insulation" from management-harbored fantasies engendered without respect to realities surrounding "time-lines".

The worst-case situation is one where the marketing departments have and/or are promising future products to customers with characteristics and specifications that design/development departments have not yet (and may possibly never) manage to actually achieve (in terms of manufacturability).

Yes, another frequent occurrence...IME often caused by poor/no communication between design, manufacturing, QA and assembly.

Such situations are not without understandable (though not necessarily "defensible") human nature causations. (In large, segmented organizations), "localized empires" are built - serving (sadly, often foremost) in order to protect the professional reputations of the managers and employees existing within such sub-divisions. Blame-shifting and "CYA" seems an endemically common "currency".

The consequent delays and increased production costs were entirely avoidable. :-(

In the particular case cited in my posted accounts, the company had been acquired by a very large parent-corporation whose profits were of a magnitude where obtaining tax write-offs for monetary losses had equal (or perhaps even greater) impact upon tax obligations than did monetary profits.

The medium-large company I think of most often WRT managerial ineptitude, poor inter-group communication, and crude, obvious lies to their employees did not have that excuse; their grandiose and (as it proved) ill-advised debt-fueled expansion plans went awry to the extent that even major reductions-in-force couldn't save them.

The foibles of human nature are not exclusive to large "juggernaut" organizations. In my first engineering technician job, I worked for a very small local company on the design and development of a side-scanning sonar system that went down amidst the incredible pressures present at around 2 Miles under the surface of the Pacific Ocean (hunting for "Manganese nodules", so that an undersea mining company could then decimate the deep sea-floor environment with impunity in order to earn themselves and shareholders monetary profits).

The output amplifier that drove the sonar transducers had no output short-circuit current protection circuitry. My boss happily ignored my youthful advice to include such circuitry (in case the rubber seals covering the sonar transducers might breach so deep under the Sea).

After the "cruise", I ran into a fellow who had gone out on the exploratory drilling-ship with my boss and all of the other people involved. The sonar transducers in which he had so much prior confidence did indeed breach at around 2 Miles depth, and the inrushing salt water shorted-out the main power-supply busses of the entire massively thick "can" full of *gobs* of undersea instrumentation. Many tens of thousands of dollars (in time as well as equipment) were as a result lost. "Murphy's Law" exemplified ...

I must confess that I laughed heartily when I heard that story about what had happened. I would be willing to bet that it was not at all a humorous event for my "seasoned" (yet in hindsight, foolishly overconfident) boss. "The kid" (me) had (in my own mind, anyway) become something of a "sage" ...

Eventually they were taken over by a larger rival...but I was gone by then. The handwriting on the wall was there for all to see in the increasingly empty parking lots and underutilized equipment.

I don't mean to be "nosy" by asking - but am curious as to what type of engineering in general ?

 

[OpticsEngineer]

My understanding was the whole manganese nodules thing was concocted as a cover story for the deep sea underwater recovery device that was built by Hughes to pull up the sunken Russian nuclear submarine. The project was just too big to hide from the Russians. Hence the cover story. Some other companies decided if Hughes was going to harvest manganese, the nodules must be real, so they spent big money building their versions of nodule harvesters. There were many geologists not in on the trick who published articles as to the lunacy of the nodule idea. No conceivable geologic mechanism to create nodules like that and scatter them on ocean floor... but only on the very very deep ocean floor. Cold war craziness I guess. My dad worked for a petroleum company so lots of geologists around. All of them suspected something odd going on because the nodule idea was so incredibly dumb.

Loading…

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Detail Man]

My understanding was the whole manganese nodules thing was concocted as a cover story for the deep sea underwater recovery device that was built by Hughes to pull up the sunken Russian nuclear submarine.

Well, funny that you would bring up Howard ... A couple of my co-workers at that little company had worked for (code-name) "Honeybucket", and they told me wonderfully amusing stories of spending thousands of "man-hours" meticulously assembling what were merely "christmas tree" (fake, albeit flashing-away like some Buck Rodgers craft) front-panels for a lot of the phony gear that adorned the interior "nerd-rooms" of the Glomar Explorer. They were personable and believable fellows to me, and they seemed to have appreciated, and to enjoy, the absurd "theatrical panache" of the whole affair.

The project was just too big to hide from the Russians. Hence the cover story.

I was under the (perhaps only mere ?) impression that the contracting company was indeed real, and that they really did dredge the Pacific Ocean area around 2 Miles down to suck-up a bit of what was down there on the ocean floor. I was told that the "nodules" (proportionally) contained more Nickel than Manganese, but were allegedly (possibly) "worth all of that trouble gathering them" - without regard for the issue that such "dredging" operations could and would clearly wreak havoc upon the deep undersea environment ...

Some other companies decided if Hughes was going to harvest manganese, the nodules must be real, so they spent big money building their versions of nodule harvesters. There were many geologists not in on the trick who published articles as to the lunacy of the nodule idea. No conceivable geologic mechanism to create nodules like that and scatter them on ocean floor... but only on the very very deep ocean floor.

Was (by "the moustached one") given 2 small little "nodules" to have for my own. I have since given them both away to others - hoping to avoid an eventual visit from the sleek "Men In Black" ...

Cold war craziness I guess. My dad worked for a petroleum company so lots of geologists around. All of them suspected something odd going on because the nodule idea was so incredibly dumb.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Azorian

I'll check that out. Never dreamed (beyond the entertaining Glomar Explorer stories) that perhaps my first engineering "gig" was (in fact) merely a theatrical role in a phantasmagorical cosmic circus arising out of (seemingly oxymoronic) modern incarnations of "military intelligence". It was my understanding their none of the "Glomars" were used on these particular projects. My boss went on to assist Robert Ballard on several documented occasions. The industry that I worked within was indeed real - but we might also ask the cogent question, "were Howard's fingernails real ?". Only his manacurist knows for sure.

An interesting Wiki page, indeed ! The project that we worked on (as well as the alleged sea-cruises that others recounted having occured) postceded "Project Azorian". (Perhaps) they were spending many millions of dollars on the project just to "keep up appearances" ? Never ... overestimate ... IQ.

DM

 

[Detail Man]

My understanding was the whole manganese nodules thing was concocted as a cover story for the deep sea underwater recovery device that was built by Hughes to pull up the sunken Russian nuclear submarine.

Well, funny that you would bring up Howard ... A couple of my co-workers at that little company had worked for (code-name) "Honeybucket", and they told me wonderfully amusing stories of spending thousands of "man-hours" meticulously assembling what were merely "christmas tree" (fake, albeit flashing-away like some Buck Rodgers craft) front-panels for a lot of the phony gear that adorned the interior "nerd-rooms" of the Glomar Explorer. They were personable and believable fellows to me, and they seemed to have appreciated, and to enjoy, the absurd "theatrical panache" of the whole affair.

The project was just too big to hide from the Russians. Hence the cover story.

I was under the (perhaps only mere ?) impression that the contracting company was indeed real, and that they really did dredge the Pacific Ocean area around 2 Miles down to suck-up a bit of what was down there on the ocean floor. I was told that the "nodules" (proportionally) contained more Nickel than Manganese, but were allegedly (possibly) "worth all of that trouble gathering them" - without regard for the issue that such "dredging" operations could and would clearly wreak havoc upon the deep undersea environment ...

Some other companies decided if Hughes was going to harvest manganese, the nodules must be real, so they spent big money building their versions of nodule harvesters. There were many geologists not in on the trick who published articles as to the lunacy of the nodule idea. No conceivable geologic mechanism to create nodules like that and scatter them on ocean floor... but only on the very very deep ocean floor.

Was (by "the moustached one") given 2 small little "nodules" to have for my own. I have since given them both away to others - hoping to avoid an eventual visit from the sleek "Men In Black".

Cold war craziness I guess. My dad worked for a petroleum company so lots of geologists around. All of them suspected something odd going on because the nodule idea was so incredibly dumb.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Azorian

I'll check that out. Never dreamed (beyond the entertaining Glomar Explorer stories) that perhaps my first engineering "gig" was (in fact) merely a theatrical role in a phantasmagorical cosmic circus arising out of (seemingly oxymoronic) modern incarnations of "military intelligence". It was my understanding that none of the "Glomars" were used on these particular projects. My boss went on to assist Robert Ballard on several documented occasions. The industry that I worked within was indeed real - but we might also ask the cogent question, "were Howard's fingernails real ?". Only his manicurist knows for sure.

An interesting Wiki page, indeed ! The project that we worked on (as well as the alleged sea-cruises that others recounted having occured) postceded "Project Azorian". (Perhaps) they were spending many millions of dollars on the project just to "keep up appearances" ? Never ... overestimate ... IQ.

Now you really have me thinking. Could it be that the sonar transducer output amplifier was (in fact, despite my expressed warnings) quite *deliberately* designed in order to fail due to massive undersea pressure on the sonar transducer ? That (somehow) the complete destruction of an entire (massively thick, expensive) "can" chocked-full of undersea instrumentation - as well as the time and expense of having to then raise that pile of "gold-plated garbage" - was ... all part of "the plan" ? ...

... Could the deliberate total and non-recoverable "hosing" of the electronic "eyes and ears" of the giant (secretly publicly funded) undersea vacuum cleaner have only been a diversion intended to divert the attention of (thus fooling the watching eyes of) foreign spy-satellites while a crashed extraterrestrial spacecraft was covertly raised from 2 miles beneath the Pacific Ocean ? ...

"Ancient astronaut theorists say, *yes* !" ... ... Really, the History Channel sadly peddles a lot of pretentious conglomerated garbage as tantalizing (albeit reductionistically ludicrous) "mind candy" seemingly intended for a 10 year-old audience. A new generation of "just add water" mystics, just in time for the "golden age of cold, dead, and all too destructive machines".

(I think) they do a real disservice to human culture by trivializing subjects that might best not be so readily trifled with, wildly speculated about, and crassly commercialized. Neither the "cathedrals" of science or theology encompass existence, which is the great humbler of all conditioned constructs ...

My very own eyes have seen things that would make both "scrambled eggs" and "Howard" quake in their boots with the realization that neither human riches, or our various technologies, shields them from that which they neither begin to understand, or could thus entertain hopes of "controlling" ...

DM

.

PS - Regarding my question recently posed to you on another thread about whether field-curvature is (conceptually) definable in the simultaneous presence of astigmatims and coma, this interesting web-page. seems to imply that - as you seemed to me to indicate - one could combine such effects on a theoretical ray-tracing basis, but separating the effects in measurements would likely be a much more involved (and perhaps at best, imprecise) affair ?

 

[Austinian]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

Yes, the (so to speak) "downstream" relation of reliability/manufacturing/test engineering personnel relative to design/development engineering functions affords those so involved some "insulation" from management-harbored fantasies engendered without respect to realities surrounding "time-lines".

The worst-case situation is one where the marketing departments have and/or are promising future products to customers with characteristics and specifications that design/development departments have not yet (and may possibly never) manage to actually achieve (in terms of manufacturability).

Yes, another frequent occurrence...IME often caused by poor/no communication between design, manufacturing, QA and assembly.

Such situations are not without understandable (though not necessarily "defensible") human nature causations. (In large, segmented organizations), "localized empires" are built - serving (sadly, often foremost) in order to protect the professional reputations of the managers and employees existing within such sub-divisions. Blame-shifting and "CYA" seems an endemically common "currency".

The consequent delays and increased production costs were entirely avoidable. :-(

In the particular case cited in my posted accounts, the company had been acquired by a very large parent-corporation whose profits were of a magnitude where obtaining tax write-offs for monetary losses had equal (or perhaps even greater) impact upon tax obligations than did monetary profits.

The medium-large company I think of most often WRT managerial ineptitude, poor inter-group communication, and crude, obvious lies to their employees did not have that excuse; their grandiose and (as it proved) ill-advised debt-fueled expansion plans went awry to the extent that even major reductions-in-force couldn't save them.

The foibles of human nature are not exclusive to large "juggernaut" organizations. In my first engineering technician job, I worked for a very small local company on the design and development of a side-scanning sonar system that went down amidst the incredible pressures present at around 2 Miles under the surface of the Pacific Ocean (hunting for "Manganese nodules", so that an undersea mining company could then decimate the deep sea-floor environment with impunity in order to earn themselves and shareholders monetary profits).

The output amplifier that drove the sonar transducers had no output short-circuit current protection circuitry. My boss happily ignored my youthful advice to include such circuitry (in case the rubber seals covering the sonar transducers might breach so deep under the Sea).

After the "cruise", I ran into a fellow who had gone out on the exploratory drilling-ship with my boss and all of the other people involved. The sonar transducers in which he had so much prior confidence did indeed breach at around 2 Miles depth, and the inrushing salt water shorted-out the main power-supply busses of the entire massively thick "can" full of *gobs* of undersea instrumentation. Many tens of thousands of dollars (in time as well as equipment) were as a result lost. "Murphy's Law" exemplified ...

Yup. Human factors can also be a wild card; I've seen 'operator errors' occur that were much more difficult to achieve than the correct procedures were.

I must confess that I laughed heartily when I heard that story about what had happened. I would be willing to bet that it was not at all a humorous event for my "seasoned" (yet in hindsight, foolishly overconfident) boss. "The kid" (me) had (in my own mind, anyway) become something of a "sage" ...

Eventually they were taken over by a larger rival...but I was gone by then. The handwriting on the wall was there for all to see in the increasingly empty parking lots and underutilized equipment.

I don't mean to be "nosy" by asking - but am curious as to what type of engineering in general ?

This was an aerospace company that had extensive defense contracts.

Some of the communication problems were allegedly due to certain things being "secret", but many of the so-called "secrets" were trivial, plainly obvious to anyone who simply handled the components. Sigh.

 

[Detail Man]

Management having a proclivity to routinely make knowingly over-optimistic schedules, and then demand to know why reality routinely does not match the phantasms, and having the politics of the warm winds of words uttered in their ritualistic meetings as their primary forte, sometimes have a way of functioning with predictable refrains when briefed by engineers:

The manufacturing engineering departments I worked for faced this situation routinely. Attempts to point out probable bottlenecks were seldom successful.

No problem. We simply waited for the design engineers ahead of us to inevitably slip the (delusional) management-demanded schedules far enough to buy us the time we needed to create the manufacturing processes. :-D

Yes, the (so to speak) "downstream" relation of reliability/manufacturing/test engineering personnel relative to design/development engineering functions affords those so involved some "insulation" from management-harbored fantasies engendered without respect to realities surrounding "time-lines".

The worst-case situation is one where the marketing departments have and/or are promising future products to customers with characteristics and specifications that design/development departments have not yet (and may possibly never) manage to actually achieve (in terms of manufacturability).

Yes, another frequent occurrence...IME often caused by poor/no communication between design, manufacturing, QA and assembly.

Such situations are not without understandable (though not necessarily "defensible") human nature causations. (In large, segmented organizations), "localized empires" are built - serving (sadly, often foremost) in order to protect the professional reputations of the managers and employees existing within such sub-divisions. Blame-shifting and "CYA" seems an endemically common "currency".

The consequent delays and increased production costs were entirely avoidable. :-(

In the particular case cited in my posted accounts, the company had been acquired by a very large parent-corporation whose profits were of a magnitude where obtaining tax write-offs for monetary losses had equal (or perhaps even greater) impact upon tax obligations than did monetary profits.

The medium-large company I think of most often WRT managerial ineptitude, poor inter-group communication, and crude, obvious lies to their employees did not have that excuse; their grandiose and (as it proved) ill-advised debt-fueled expansion plans went awry to the extent that even major reductions-in-force couldn't save them.

The foibles of human nature are not exclusive to large "juggernaut" organizations. In my first engineering technician job, I worked for a very small local company on the design and development of a side-scanning sonar system that went down amidst the incredible pressures present at around 2 Miles under the surface of the Pacific Ocean (hunting for "Manganese nodules", so that an undersea mining company could then decimate the deep sea-floor environment with impunity in order to earn themselves and shareholders monetary profits).

The output amplifier that drove the sonar transducers had no output short-circuit current protection circuitry. My boss happily ignored my youthful advice to include such circuitry (in case the rubber seals covering the sonar transducers might breach so deep under the Sea).

After the "cruise", I ran into a fellow who had gone out on the exploratory drilling-ship with my boss and all of the other people involved. The sonar transducers in which he had so much prior confidence did indeed breach at around 2 Miles depth, and the inrushing salt water shorted-out the main power-supply busses of the entire massively thick "can" full of *gobs* of undersea instrumentation. Many tens of thousands of dollars (in time as well as equipment) were as a result lost. "Murphy's Law" exemplified ...

Yup. Human factors can also be a wild card; I've seen 'operator errors' occur that were much more difficult to achieve than the correct procedures were.

I must confess that I laughed heartily when I heard that story about what had happened. I would be willing to bet that it was not at all a humorous event for my "seasoned" (yet in hindsight, foolishly overconfident) boss. "The kid" (me) had (in my own mind, anyway) become something of a "sage" ...

Eventually they were taken over by a larger rival...but I was gone by then. The handwriting on the wall was there for all to see in the increasingly empty parking lots and underutilized equipment.

I don't mean to be "nosy" by asking - but am curious as to what type of engineering in general ?

This was an aerospace company that had extensive defense contracts.

Ah, so it was not so unlike the private-sector juggernaut joint previously described. In fact, the whole point was/is to hurredly "use or lose" public monies under the auspices of "national security". "Risk" is socialized so that warrior-elites can flourish without challenge. Such is, of course, all performed in the interest of "the children", who shall carry on and sustain "the Homeland of the righteously humble".

Some of the communication problems were allegedly due to certain things being "secret", but many of the so-called "secrets" were trivial, plainly obvious to anyone who simply handled the components. Sigh.

The older I get, the more that I am convinced that the phrase "military intelligence" is an oxymoron.

I once interviewed at a "fat and happy" military contractor who was at the time working on contracts for the first "stealth bomber". The place was completely empty of personnel in the middle of the afternoon. I was told in all seriousness that the "crew" was off playing (get this) "water polo". They wanted to hire me and throw plenty of money my way - but my pacifist soul could not in good conscience participate in that "gravy-train to mutually assured destruction".

When I die, how I paid the rent will not matter - but I believe my moral choices and chosen actions will. Nowadays, "death from the skies" seems to have become our only (myopic) horizon, as we race to eliminate all species in our incredible proclivities for self-righteous and self-defeating destruction ... all, of course, under the vaporous auspices of "divine providence".

"Invention is the mother of necessity" - in the consumer-state, as well as in the "psychotic-state".

The price of eternal vigilance is indifference.
-Marshall McLuhan

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DM