Win 11 system requirements and compatibility talk

Great idea, too obstructive. If it did a popup message like the firewall dose when a new application tries to access a folder it would work
That's a good idea; I know what to expect, but a naive user may not.
No one can reliably make a decision, what is and what is not a legitimate file access based only on the names of files and programs involved. It's not difficult for an attacker to give his program a legitimate-sounding name, and most exploits run from the context of legitimate vulnerable processes in the first place.

This can also block a scheduled legitimate procedure that runs unattended, for example, backup, while malware will be running under the guise of another existing service.
Should such malware ever invade my system it would still run if I didn't use Controlled folders. If you expect any single defense to be absolutely perfect you're likely to be disappointed. Consider it just another brick in the security wall. :-)
Computer security does not work like that. Defense is supposed to be in depth, not in breadth, with all those "bricks" laid randomly in hope that the next attack will hit them and not the widely open space next to them.
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
If I were to see a program blocked aside from one I'd just executed myself for the first time ( I haven't), I wouldn't whitelist it but start an investigation instead.
And cause data inconsistency for some service that happened to be recording its state at the time.
I have seen no evidence of Controlled folders causing any problems in my system. Unless I see a good reason to not use them, I plan to continue despite your endless criticism.
 
So is this something that’s different but sort of parallel in functionality to the virtual TPM you can provision on a VM? From what I saw when I poked around was the virtual TPM needed crypto provider and key distribution roles and those only came from Vcenter. They were not part of the ESXi hypervisor where the hardware availablity on the host would seem to matter.
 
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Great idea, too obstructive. If it did a popup message like the firewall dose when a new application tries to access a folder it would work
That's a good idea; I know what to expect, but a naive user may not.
No one can reliably make a decision, what is and what is not a legitimate file access based only on the names of files and programs involved. It's not difficult for an attacker to give his program a legitimate-sounding name, and most exploits run from the context of legitimate vulnerable processes in the first place.

This can also block a scheduled legitimate procedure that runs unattended, for example, backup, while malware will be running under the guise of another existing service.
Should such malware ever invade my system it would still run if I didn't use Controlled folders. If you expect any single defense to be absolutely perfect you're likely to be disappointed. Consider it just another brick in the security wall. :-)
Computer security does not work like that. Defense is supposed to be in depth, not in breadth, with all those "bricks" laid randomly in hope that the next attack will hit them and not the widely open space next to them.
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
That's not the point. The problem is, its protection is very, very specific, and attacks successfully avoid it. It's about as useful as a copy of antivirus from three years ago -- sure, you might happen to get a specific old version of malware that existed then, however most likely if there will be a threat, it will be something else. In the same way, malware may just happen to run an executable called "my_31337_5p10i7.exe" to encrypt your data, like they did at some point before, however most likely it will hijack a program that is supposed to be able to access your files.
If I were to see a program blocked aside from one I'd just executed myself for the first time ( I haven't), I wouldn't whitelist it but start an investigation instead.
And cause data inconsistency for some service that happened to be recording its state at the time.
I have seen no evidence of Controlled folders causing any problems in my system.

Unless I see a good reason to not use them, I plan to continue despite your endless criticism.
It's a matter of probabilities. It's much more likely to happen than a successful prevention of an attack.
 
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I've not looked into it in detail, but did find a comprehensive web page that gave the information on it, plus the needed settings.

I would not suppose it matters whether there is a virtual or physical TPM in any of the operating systems. They should be equivalent in function.

--
Phoenix Arizona Craig
www.cjcphoto.net
"I miss the days when I was nostalgic."
 
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Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
That's not the point. The problem is, its protection is very, very specific, and attacks successfully avoid it.
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders. An attack that can go and modify your executables without detection has pretty much taken over your system no matter what measures you have in place.

Controlled Folders will prevent any unknown executable from causing harm, and that probably accounts for the large majority of attacks.
 
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
That's not the point. The problem is, its protection is very, very specific, and attacks successfully avoid it.
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders. An attack that can go and modify your executables without detection has pretty much taken over your system no matter what measures you have in place.

Controlled Folders will prevent any unknown executable from causing harm, and that probably accounts for the large majority of attacks.
Hi Sean,

Just boot the system via a USB standalone OS and you own that disk if it is not encrypted.

Morris
 
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
That's not the point. The problem is, its protection is very, very specific, and attacks successfully avoid it.
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders. An attack that can go and modify your executables without detection has pretty much taken over your system no matter what measures you have in place.

Controlled Folders will prevent any unknown executable from causing harm, and that probably accounts for the large majority of attacks.
Hi Sean,

Just boot the system via a USB standalone OS and you own that disk if it is not encrypted.

Morris
That's what Bitlocker is for.
 
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
That's not the point. The problem is, its protection is very, very specific, and attacks successfully avoid it.
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders.
You don't need any special "way" to do that. The reason there is malware running on a system in the first place is usually (that is, if it's not the user manually starting it) an exploited vulnerability in running software. Malware already executes on behalf of that software, some existing process. It has to do something special, like writing an launching a separate executable, to be recognized as something else. What malware authors often did before for convenience, because then everything that anyone wrote anywhere was executable and had user's (in not administrator's) permissions already. Those times are gone, so malware authors adapted to it.

Nevertheless to make it _look_ like the request is coming from a different executable, it's sufficient to make an executable with the name that looks like legitimate one (for example, with identical symbols from a different language, like "fоо" instead of "foo"), place it into a directory in a very long path that can't be displayed whole, reproduce the whole warning message inside the file name, etc.

This is why properly designed security mechanisms should never, ever ask the user to approve anything at runtime. Because if permission model does not know, the user certainly does not know, either.
 
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders.
Nevertheless to make it _look_ like the request is coming from a different executable, it's sufficient to make an executable with the name that looks like legitimate one (for example, with identical symbols from a different language, like "fоо" instead of "foo"), place it into a directory in a very long path that can't be displayed whole, reproduce the whole warning message inside the file name, etc.
That's relying on user ignorance to not fully validate the name that they're enabling. It may work with some naive users but it's not likely to for those who are savvy enough to turn on controlled folder access.
 
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders.
Nevertheless to make it _look_ like the request is coming from a different executable, it's sufficient to make an executable with the name that looks like legitimate one (for example, with identical symbols from a different language, like "fоо" instead of "foo"), place it into a directory in a very long path that can't be displayed whole, reproduce the whole warning message inside the file name, etc.
That's relying on user ignorance to not fully validate the name that they're enabling.

It may work with some naive users but it's not likely to for those who are savvy enough to turn on controlled folder access.
The name or the message will look absolutely identical. To see the difference you would have to bring up a debugger.
 
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders.
Nevertheless to make it _look_ like the request is coming from a different executable, it's sufficient to make an executable with the name that looks like legitimate one (for example, with identical symbols from a different language, like "fоо" instead of "foo"), place it into a directory in a very long path that can't be displayed whole, reproduce the whole warning message inside the file name, etc.
That's relying on user ignorance to not fully validate the name that they're enabling.

It may work with some naive users but it's not likely to for those who are savvy enough to turn on controlled folder access.
The name or the message will look absolutely identical. To see the difference you would have to bring up a debugger.
You could, for example, copy and paste the full path name into a console window using "dir" to see where the file resides. You can also, when authorizing the executable, type the name in yourself using the characters you believe should be in the name, or copy and paste them from the bona fide executable file.
 
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Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
That's not the point. The problem is, its protection is very, very specific, and attacks successfully avoid it.
I'm not aware of any way to circumvent Controlled Folders other than by replacing an existing ".exe" image that's authorized to access those folders.
You don't need any special "way" to do that. The reason there is malware running on a system in the first place is usually (that is, if it's not the user manually starting it) an exploited vulnerability in running software. Malware already executes on behalf of that software, some existing process. It has to do something special, like writing an launching a separate executable, to be recognized as something else. What malware authors often did before for convenience, because then everything that anyone wrote anywhere was executable and had user's (in not administrator's) permissions already. Those times are gone, so malware authors adapted to it.

Nevertheless to make it _look_ like the request is coming from a different executable, it's sufficient to make an executable with the name that looks like legitimate one (for example, with identical symbols from a different language, like "fоо" instead of "foo"), place it into a directory in a very long path that can't be displayed whole, reproduce the whole warning message inside the file name, etc.

This is why properly designed security mechanisms should never, ever ask the user to approve anything at runtime. Because if permission model does not know, the user certainly does not know, either.
Today, most malware get in due to this vulnerability: Humans!

Morris
 
Great idea, too obstructive. If it did a popup message like the firewall dose when a new application tries to access a folder it would work
That's a good idea; I know what to expect, but a naive user may not.
No one can reliably make a decision, what is and what is not a legitimate file access based only on the names of files and programs involved. It's not difficult for an attacker to give his program a legitimate-sounding name, and most exploits run from the context of legitimate vulnerable processes in the first place.

This can also block a scheduled legitimate procedure that runs unattended, for example, backup, while malware will be running under the guise of another existing service.
Should such malware ever invade my system it would still run if I didn't use Controlled folders. If you expect any single defense to be absolutely perfect you're likely to be disappointed. Consider it just another brick in the security wall. :-)
Computer security does not work like that. Defense is supposed to be in depth, not in breadth, with all those "bricks" laid randomly in hope that the next attack will hit them and not the widely open space next to them.
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
If I were to see a program blocked aside from one I'd just executed myself for the first time ( I haven't), I wouldn't whitelist it but start an investigation instead.
And cause data inconsistency for some service that happened to be recording its state at the time.
I have seen no evidence of Controlled folders causing any problems in my system. Unless I see a good reason to not use them, I plan to continue despite your endless criticism.
I could not run an older and fully supported and patched version of Word controlled folder access on. Photoshop was another one with issues. For years we stored files where we liked and then all of a sudden nothing works. At the very least there should be an interview and warnings when you turn it off to avoid the denial of service. Controlled folder access is like driving on an interstate that dose not have warning signs that an exit is coming. You are driving as you always do and all of a sudden you are in the wrong lane to get off.

Morris
 
Great idea, too obstructive. If it did a popup message like the firewall dose when a new application tries to access a folder it would work
That's a good idea; I know what to expect, but a naive user may not.
No one can reliably make a decision, what is and what is not a legitimate file access based only on the names of files and programs involved. It's not difficult for an attacker to give his program a legitimate-sounding name, and most exploits run from the context of legitimate vulnerable processes in the first place.

This can also block a scheduled legitimate procedure that runs unattended, for example, backup, while malware will be running under the guise of another existing service.
Should such malware ever invade my system it would still run if I didn't use Controlled folders. If you expect any single defense to be absolutely perfect you're likely to be disappointed. Consider it just another brick in the security wall. :-)
Computer security does not work like that. Defense is supposed to be in depth, not in breadth, with all those "bricks" laid randomly in hope that the next attack will hit them and not the widely open space next to them.
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
If I were to see a program blocked aside from one I'd just executed myself for the first time ( I haven't), I wouldn't whitelist it but start an investigation instead.
And cause data inconsistency for some service that happened to be recording its state at the time.
I have seen no evidence of Controlled folders causing any problems in my system. Unless I see a good reason to not use them, I plan to continue despite your endless criticism.
I could not run an older and fully supported and patched version of Word controlled folder access on. Photoshop was another one with issues. For years we stored files where we liked and then all of a sudden nothing works. At the very least there should be an interview and warnings when you turn it off to avoid the denial of service. Controlled folder access is like driving on an interstate that dose not have warning signs that an exit is coming. You are driving as you always do and all of a sudden you are in the wrong lane to get off.
Then maybe Controlled folders are not for you; I don't use Word or Photoshop, perhaps they have an inconveniently large number of different processes associated with them? I remember that I had to whitelist a couple of processes that PhotoLab 4 uses, and probably a few others as well.

For me, it was obvious what had happened when PhotoLab, etc. was unable to save files to where I expected, but I agree that explicit and emphatic warnings would be a very good idea.
 
Great idea, too obstructive. If it did a popup message like the firewall dose when a new application tries to access a folder it would work
That's a good idea; I know what to expect, but a naive user may not.
No one can reliably make a decision, what is and what is not a legitimate file access based only on the names of files and programs involved. It's not difficult for an attacker to give his program a legitimate-sounding name, and most exploits run from the context of legitimate vulnerable processes in the first place.

This can also block a scheduled legitimate procedure that runs unattended, for example, backup, while malware will be running under the guise of another existing service.
Should such malware ever invade my system it would still run if I didn't use Controlled folders. If you expect any single defense to be absolutely perfect you're likely to be disappointed. Consider it just another brick in the security wall. :-)
Computer security does not work like that. Defense is supposed to be in depth, not in breadth, with all those "bricks" laid randomly in hope that the next attack will hit them and not the widely open space next to them.
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
If I were to see a program blocked aside from one I'd just executed myself for the first time ( I haven't), I wouldn't whitelist it but start an investigation instead.
And cause data inconsistency for some service that happened to be recording its state at the time.
I have seen no evidence of Controlled folders causing any problems in my system. Unless I see a good reason to not use them, I plan to continue despite your endless criticism.
I could not run an older and fully supported and patched version of Word controlled folder access on. Photoshop was another one with issues. For years we stored files where we liked and then all of a sudden nothing works. At the very least there should be an interview and warnings when you turn it off to avoid the denial of service. Controlled folder access is like driving on an interstate that dose not have warning signs that an exit is coming. You are driving as you always do and all of a sudden you are in the wrong lane to get off.
Then maybe Controlled folders are not for you; I don't use Word or Photoshop, perhaps they have an inconveniently large number of different processes associated with them? I remember that I had to whitelist a couple of processes that PhotoLab 4 uses, and probably a few others as well.

For me, it was obvious what had happened when PhotoLab, etc. was unable to save files to where I expected, but I agree that explicit and emphatic warnings would be a very good idea.
Up to date versions of Word and Photoshop work just fine with CFA enabled.
 
This page may be a useful reference for those curious about Windows 11 but not ready to try it out:

 
Apparently you can run Windows 11 on a Raspberry Pi. Haven't tried it yet myself, but it might be my only hardware that runs it.

 
Great idea, too obstructive. If it did a popup message like the firewall dose when a new application tries to access a folder it would work
That's a good idea; I know what to expect, but a naive user may not.
No one can reliably make a decision, what is and what is not a legitimate file access based only on the names of files and programs involved. It's not difficult for an attacker to give his program a legitimate-sounding name, and most exploits run from the context of legitimate vulnerable processes in the first place.

This can also block a scheduled legitimate procedure that runs unattended, for example, backup, while malware will be running under the guise of another existing service.
Should such malware ever invade my system it would still run if I didn't use Controlled folders. If you expect any single defense to be absolutely perfect you're likely to be disappointed. Consider it just another brick in the security wall. :-)
Computer security does not work like that. Defense is supposed to be in depth, not in breadth, with all those "bricks" laid randomly in hope that the next attack will hit them and not the widely open space next to them.
Surely you don't imagine I rely on Controlled folders for all my security.
If I were to see a program blocked aside from one I'd just executed myself for the first time ( I haven't), I wouldn't whitelist it but start an investigation instead.
And cause data inconsistency for some service that happened to be recording its state at the time.
I have seen no evidence of Controlled folders causing any problems in my system. Unless I see a good reason to not use them, I plan to continue despite your endless criticism.
I could not run an older and fully supported and patched version of Word controlled folder access on. Photoshop was another one with issues. For years we stored files where we liked and then all of a sudden nothing works. At the very least there should be an interview and warnings when you turn it off to avoid the denial of service. Controlled folder access is like driving on an interstate that dose not have warning signs that an exit is coming. You are driving as you always do and all of a sudden you are in the wrong lane to get off.
Then maybe Controlled folders are not for you; I don't use Word or Photoshop, perhaps they have an inconveniently large number of different processes associated with them? I remember that I had to whitelist a couple of processes that PhotoLab 4 uses, and probably a few others as well.

For me, it was obvious what had happened when PhotoLab, etc. was unable to save files to where I expected, but I agree that explicit and emphatic warnings would be a very good idea.
Up to date versions of Word and Photoshop work just fine with CFA enabled.
That's good. I have not looked back since it was a disaster. If CFA goes off as the result of a ransomware attack, you still have an infected system to deal with. Backup is still the easiest way out.

Morris
 

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